Securing the northern maritime border through maritime domain awareness by Westling, Jeffrey C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2010-09
Securing the northern maritime border through
maritime domain awareness
Westling, Jeffrey C.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
SECURING THE NORTHERN MARITIME BORDER 








 Thesis Advisor:   Robert Bach 
 Second Reader: Stanley Supinski 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2010 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Securing the Northern Maritime Border Through 
Maritime Domain Awareness 
6. AUTHOR(S)   
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Since September 11, 2001, both the United States and the Canadian governments have established plans and 
initiatives to improve maritime domain awareness (MDA) in their nations’ ports and maritime approaches. Agencies 
entrusted with maritime homeland security for the United States are challenged to push detection, identification, and 
surveillance of maritime threats away from the U.S. shoreline. 
In the Great Lakes region, the proximity of the U.S.–Canada border complicates these efforts. A system-wide 
approach to homeland security on the Great Lakes is needed. Creation of a formal U.S.–Canada joint organizational 
entity with full-time representation from each federal agency, state, and province adjoining the Great Lakes would 
establish a binational MDA common operating picture while facilitating a timely, effective flow of information, 
intelligence, and resources. 
This research project describes the unique maritime homeland security issues confronting the Great Lakes, 
discusses requirements to achieve complete MDA and establish a common operating picture (COP), and reviews 
several models currently utilized for binational and port-centric collaboration. Finally, it recommends combining the 
port-centric concept of interagency operations centers required by the SAFE Port Act of 2006 with binational 
collaboration into a system-wide approach for a Great Lakes Maritime Operations Center. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
99 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Border Security; Maritime Domain Awareness; MDA; Common Operating 
Picture; COP; Nationwide Automatic Identification System; NAIS; AIS; Interagency Operation 
Center; Great Lakes; Maritime Security; Collaboration; Information Sharing; Surveillance; United 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Jeffrey C. Westling, P.E. 
Commander, United States Coast Guard 
B.S., United States Coast Guard Academy, 1991 
M.A., Regent University, 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Since September 11, 2001, both the United States and the Canadian governments have 
established plans and initiatives to improve maritime domain awareness (MDA) in their 
nations’ ports and maritime approaches. Agencies entrusted with maritime homeland 
security for the United States are challenged to push detection, identification, and 
surveillance of maritime threats away from the U.S. shoreline. 
In the Great Lakes region, the proximity of the U.S.–Canada border complicates 
these efforts. A system-wide approach to homeland security on the Great Lakes is 
needed. Creation of a formal U.S.–Canada joint organizational entity with full-time 
representation from each federal agency, state, and province adjoining the Great Lakes 
would establish a binational MDA common operating picture while facilitating a timely, 
effective flow of information, intelligence, and resources. 
This research project describes the unique maritime homeland security issues 
confronting the Great Lakes, discusses requirements to achieve complete MDA and 
establish a common operating picture (COP), and reviews several models currently 
utilized for binational and port-centric collaboration. Finally, it recommends combining 
the port-centric concept of interagency operations centers required by the SAFE Port Act 
of 2006 with binational collaboration into a system-wide approach for a Great Lakes 
Maritime Operations Center. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The United States’ northern border with Canada poses several unique 
vulnerabilities in the maritime domain that are not experienced at the majority of U.S. 
ports on the east and west coasts. The minimal distances and open border between the 
United States and Canada provide significant opportunities for vessel-borne and other 
maritime threats to enter both nations. The close proximity between the two nations, 
including the sovereign Indian nations, along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River 
provide opportunities and infinite access points for cross-border smuggling activity 
(including weapons, illegal immigrants, drugs, and money). Terrorist cells have been 
disrupted in Canadian and U.S. cities along the Great Lakes shoreline. The lack of 
adequate monitoring capability throughout the region extends to commercial and 
recreational vessels on the Great Lakes and rivers, resulting in a lack of maritime domain 
awareness (MDA) on the Great Lakes system. Limitations on the ability of armed U.S. 
and Canadian law enforcement agencies to pursue suspects across the international 
border reduce the chance that they will be caught.  
The minimal distances between the United States and Canada throughout most of 
the Great Lakes system pose unique MDA challenges. Depending on the size, draft, and 
maximum speed of vessels transiting the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway, 
much of the Great Lakes can be crossed in four hours or less at speeds of 30 knots. Some 
of the most heavily transited passages are only several hundred yards wide between 
United States and Canadian shorelines. Small vessels can illegally transport people, 
drugs, weapons, and money (including counterfeit) south into the United States or north 
into Canada. Given the current resources and technologies operating on the Great Lakes, 
it is impossible to observe or track these vessels in order to target them on a recurring 
basis for intercept. Partnerships among United States Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) agencies, local law enforcement, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
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(RCMP) have provided opportunities for cross-jurisdiction cooperation and sharing of 
resources, but the capacity for joint operations depends on the resources and mission of 
each agency.  
Currently, DHS federal agencies are developing their agencies’ common 
operating picture (COP) in order to improve the effectiveness of each agency’s mission 
execution. Canada has established Marine Security Operations Centers (MSOCs) to 
collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate intelligence and mission-critical information 
among Canadian agencies and the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET). The 
U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, Maritime Security Policy (HSPD-13) 
directs a coordinated and collaborative intelligence effort among the departments of 
Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, and the Director of Central Intelligence that uses 
existing capabilities to integrate all available intelligence to identify and prevent maritime 
threats (White House, 2004). The Security and Accountability For Every Port Act (SAFE 
Port Act) of 2006 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to “establish interaction 
operational centers for port security at all high-priority ports not later than 3 years after 
the date of enactment of the SAFE Port Act” (SAFE Port Act of 2006). While port-
centric intelligence fusion centers and interagency operations centers meet agency 
specific requirements of HSPD-13 and the SAFE Port Act of 2006, the proximity of the 
United States and Canada, coupled with the historic peace between those nations, 
requires a system-wide operational view of the entire Great Lakes system. A high degree 
of interconnectivity between port-centric interagency operations centers is required to 
have a fully coordinated and collaborative planning, intelligence sharing and homeland 
security posture for all communities along the Great Lakes, interconnecting rivers, and 
the St. Lawrence Seaway. 
With regard to the challenges that prevent complete maritime domain awareness 
(MDA) on the northern maritime border between the United States and Canada, research  
is very limited. The available literature can be classified as academic research, 
legislation, intelligence, policies or official guidelines, and government documents. The 
bulk of the academic literature regarding MDA consists of reports of Department of 
Defense educational institutions such as the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and the U.S. 
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Naval War College, government documents produced by United States and Canadian 
agencies, and reports and papers produced in Canada. Most of this literature addresses the 
concepts of MDA that push United States borders as far offshore as possible while 
addressing how to maintain MDA in major east and west coast ports and approaches. 
Literature addressing MDA specific to the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway is 
sparse.  
Commander Robert Watts, USCG, states that “while there are many potential 
systems that could provide a high degree of surveillance and tracking, the actual fusion of 
this data remains problematic” (Watts, 2006). He claims that, to be effective, MDA must 
operate on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the organization while ensuring 
that these three levels remain linked to each other in order to maintain a common 
operating picture (COP) (Watts, 2006). To provide detailed and consistent MDA, the 
entire span of the lakes from Duluth, Minnesota, on Lake Superior to Massena, New 
York, on the St. Lawrence River must be viewed as a single maritime system.  
Strategically, MDA must collectively address the security and protection of the 
six states, two Canadian provinces, and multiple Indian reservations that form the Great 
Lakes system shoreline. Operationally, a COP must be shared among partner agencies to 
allow each to exercise full jurisdictional authority while maximizing opportunities to 
develop effective partnerships, share limited resources, and clearly identify threats and 
targets of interest. Tactically, each jurisdiction must be able to operate its resources with 
full knowledge of potential threats and risks posed in the operating environment, to share 
real-time vessel threat and target information, and to coordinate among partner federal, 
state, local, and international homeland security and law enforcement agencies to thwart 
threats to the ports, waterway, and shores of both the United States and Canada. 
B. ARGUMENT 
Achieving full maritime domain awareness (MDA) on the United States–Canada 
maritime border requires an integrated multiagency, multistate, binational COP to 
mitigate, thwart, or neutralize terrorist and criminal threats throughout the Great Lakes 
system. DHS agencies need to establish a joint system that tracks and monitors all vessels 
 4
operating throughout the Great Lakes. Development of an integrated COP that presents 
full MDA will provide more opportunities for DHS agencies tasked with border 
responsibilities to share information and resources and to improve overall response to 
border-related threats against the United States. Interoperability between the Great Lakes 
Maritime Operation Center and each DHS agency major command office would allow for 
the sharing of the COP relative to the assigned area of responsibility. Data sharing 
between the United States and Canadian partners responsible for homeland security and 
MDA would be enhanced by interconnecting the United States Great Lake’s COP and 
Canada’s existing Maritime Security Operation Centres (MSOCs). 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What elements of a COP are critical for the United States to improve MDA for 
the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway? How can a COP be established to 
maximize the effectiveness of interagency partnerships to increase homeland security 
along the northern maritime border?  
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Research regarding MDA on the Great Lakes expands on the existing concept of 
MDA and places it in the context of international borders that do not have the luxury of 
“pushing the border” and keeping the detection and deterrence of threats offshore. Such 
research will contribute to the existing body of data and analysis regarding the Great 
Lakes maritime domain. 
This thesis will set the foundation for discussions regarding the need to develop 
integrated surveillance, detection, intelligence fusion, and operations capabilities on the 
Great Lakes that blend the operational and homeland security functions and information 
requirements of all United States agencies with their counterparts in Canada. The intent is 
to identify the MDA requirements for the Great Lakes and recommend how to integrate 
the key requirements and elements of existing operational pictures into a single COP that 
will increase the collaboration, cooperation, and effectiveness of these primary agencies 
tasked with securing the international border in this maritime domain. 
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The primary consumer of this report is intended to be the Department of 
Homeland Security with the specific goal of substantiating the need and justifying the 
investment in a solution to provide an integrated COP for the Great Lakes’ DHS 
community. This thesis will bolster the case for increased acquisitions and operations 
funding to design, develop, integrate, and test the information technology backbone for a 
multisensor COP that provides complete MDA on the Great Lakes. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The horrific events of September 11, 2001, forever changed the way the United 
States examines, prepares, and addresses threats to its homeland security. While the 
attacks utilized aircraft, significant consideration has been given to protecting U.S. 
citizens, ports, and infrastructure from attack within the maritime domain. The primary 
goal of this thesis is to increase the collective understanding of the unique challenges to 
homeland security along the Great Lakes maritime border between the U.S. and Canada 
and to propose a binational, interagency maritime operation center that focuses on the 
Great Lakes as a single system, rather than a series of individual ports. 
Chapter II highlights key elements of U.S. maritime security policy and its 
application to the Great Lakes. Chapter III presents a historical perspective of Great 
Lakes border concerns and the need for change, since 9/11 and details some of the current 
collaborative initiatives occurring on the border. In Chapter IV, the specific requirements 
to achieve port-centric MDA and establish a regional COP are synthesized from various 
mission needs assessments, operational requirements documents, and DHS acquisition 
strategies. Chapter V assesses several individual models for interagency collaboration 
with the intent to apply them to the unique security challenges that exist in the Great 
Lakes system. Finally, this thesis will propose an alternative to address the need for 
binational, interagency coordination and collaboration between the United States and 
Canada, across state and provincial jurisdictions and among hundreds of federal, state, 
provincial, and local agencies responsible for elements of homeland security along the 
maritime international border. 
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II.  UNITED STATES MDA POLICY AND GREAT LAKES 
VULNERABILITY 
“While commercial aviation remains a possible target, terrorists may turn their 
attention to other modes. Opportunities to do harm are as great or greater, in maritime … 
transportation” (9/11 Commission, 2003). When the 9/11 Commission report was 
released to the public on July 22, 2004, it was evident that the members of the 9/11 
Commission clearly understood the risks and vulnerabilities to our nation’s ports and 
waterways in the post–9/11 world. 
The proximity of major United States and Canadian ports of entry throughout the 
Great Lakes system provides a unique opportunity for terrorists to exploit international 
multimodal infrastructure and transportation nodes that intersect along the rivers 
interconnecting the Great Lakes. Railroad, vehicle, and pedestrian bridges between the 
United States and Canada cross the St. Lawrence River, the Niagara River, the Detroit 
River, and St. Mary’s River. Many of these bridges form the primary thoroughfares for 
citizens and commerce of both countries to transit from the midwestern states to the New 
England states across Canada’s Ontario province to shorten distances of travel. The 
vulnerabilities of these international crossings, the internationally shared navigational 
channels in the rivers underneath the bridges, and the adjacent roads and railroad tracks 
all provide an intertwined transportation system where a failure in any single system due 
to terrorist events or natural disasters has the distinct reality of rendering another mode 
temporarily useless. Additionally, travel across open water on Lake Superior, Lake 
Michigan, Lake Huron, Lake St. Clair, Lake Erie, and Lake Ontario provide uncontrolled 
access for more than a thousand miles of international border with opportunities to access 
even greater distances of shoreline. 
A. MDA POLICY—HSPD-13 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, Maritime Security Policy (HSPD-
13), states that “the United States, in cooperation with our allies and friends around the 
world and our State, local and private sector partners, will work to ensure that lawful 
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private and public activities in the Maritime Domain are protected against attack and 
criminal and otherwise unlawful or hostile exploitation. These efforts are critical to 
global economic stability and growth and are vital to the interests of the United States” 
(White House, 2004, p. 2). HSPD-13 directs a coordinated and collaborative intelligence 
effort among the departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, and the Director of 
Central Intelligence that uses existing capabilities to integrate all available intelligence to 
identify and prevent maritime threats (White House, 2004, p.). 
The Department of Homeland Security framed MDA as consisting of accurate 
information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and 
people extending well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries (United States 
Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2005, p. ii). The greatest challenge in 
securing the maritime domain is the vastness of expanse, the medium by which threats 
can move, and the “broad array of potential targets that fit the terrorists’ operational 
objectives of achieving mass casualties and inflicting catastrophic economic harm” 
(USDHS, 2005). Three overarching principles guide the maritime strategy: 1) preserve 
the freedom of the seas, 2) facilitate and defend commerce, and (3) facilitate the 
movement of desirable goods and people across our borders while screening out 
dangerous people and material (USDHS, 2005). To further define this strategy, the 
“National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness” states that MDA consists of: 
• All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on 
a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related 
activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels or other conveyances, 
and 
• The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime 
domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of 
the United States. (USDHS, 2005) 
To eliminate any confusion among federal agencies and homeland security 
partners, the strategy also defines four critical objectives to guide maritime security 
activities: 
• Prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts; 
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• Protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructure; 
• Minimize damage and expedite recovery; 
• Safeguard the ocean and its resources. (USDHS, 2005) 
B. GREAT LAKES VULNERABILITY 
While the Great Lakes are not, by definition, oceans, they are a single freshwater 
lake system that shares an international border of more than 1,000 nautical miles and 
connects oceangoing intercontinental commerce with interstate and international 
commerce at many large inland ports in Canada and the United States. For this reason, 
the same strategies that exist for oceangoing commerce and coastal ports should apply to 
vessels operating on and at ports located within the Great Lakes system. The same 
maritime threats to the maritime domain identified by the strategy are also present 
throughout the Great Lakes system. For example, non-state (terrorist) threats tied to the 
al-Qaeda network have been arrested in Lackawanna, New York, Detroit, Michigan, and 
Toronto, Ontario. Transnational criminal threats involved in movement of humans, 
weapons, money, and drugs have been caught through joint law enforcement actions at 
land-based ports of entry and on the waters of the Great Lakes system by federal, state, 
local, and Canadian law enforcement personnel. Additionally, the Great Lakes system 
directly provides for the recreation and livelihood of millions of people throughout the 
United States and Canada.  
Given the vital interests located on the Great Lakes, any terrorist or natural or 
man-made environmental catastrophe anywhere in the Great Lakes system has the 
potential to cripple commerce, or to render drinking/industrial water supplies and 
recreational avenues useless, even if only temporarily. Additionally, due to the close 
proximity of the border to both the United States and Canada—in some cases less than 
100 yards—illegal immigrants can access miles of relatively unpopulated area where they 
can quickly cross the border between countries, unnoticed by homeland security and law 
enforcement personnel. The importance of the Great Lakes system and the myriad 
opportunities for exploitation of homeland security vulnerabilities only increase the need  
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for interstate and international cooperation and coordination among all states, levels of 
government, and with Canada to protect the people, the commerce, and the environment 
that depend on this precious international resource. 
C. GMCOI AND THE U.S. COAST GUARD 
To achieve awareness across such expansive and diverse areas, a fully cooperative 
and collaborative Global Maritime Community of Interest (GMCOI) is essential to 
meeting the strategic goals and objectives of HSPD-13. The GMCOI includes “the 
federal, state and local departments and agencies with responsibilities in the maritime 
domain” (USDHS, 2005, p. ii). Due to shared and common maritime interests and risks, 
GMCOI also includes public, private, and commercial stakeholders, as well as foreign 
governments and international stakeholders (USDHS, 2005). 
The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness clearly identifies the 
objectives that constitute the MDA essential task list guiding capabilities that the United 
States will pursue in conjunction with the GMCOI: 
1) Persistently monitor in the global maritime domain: 
a. Vessels and craft; 
b. Cargo; 
c. Vessel crews and passengers; 
d. All identified areas of interest. 
2) Access and maintain data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure. 
3) Collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate information to decision makers to 
facilitate effective understanding. 
4) Access, develop, and maintain data on MDA-related mission performance. 
(USDHS, 2005) 
The strategy described in the “Maritime Sentinel: Coast Guard Strategic Plan for 
Combating Maritime Terrorism” leverages the Coast Guard’s military, maritime, and 
multimission heritage to embrace and develop a threat-based, risk-managed approach to 
combating terrorism in our nation’s ports and waterways (USCG, 2006b). To meet the 
requirements of the various strategic documents and directives regarding maritime 
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security, the Coast Guard is actively developing common operating pictures (COP) for all 
major ports. The purpose of the COPs is to provide real-time information on blue, red, 
and white forces (friendly, enemy, and neutral vessel/target tracklines) operating in the 
maritime domain.  
Existing data sharing opportunities and sources that currently support the 
formation of the COP include classified DoD feeds, USCG Cutter and COP-capable 
aircraft track reports, and Vessel Traffic Service (VTS). According to Coast Guard 
operational requirements documents, a future data feed currently in design is the 
Automatic Identification System (AIS). Also, a well-developed nationwide network of 
surface radars, radio communications towers (high and low level HF sites), Coast Guard, 
Navy, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) vessels and buoys 
form the basis of the vessel tracking within many of the nation’s major ports and 
waterways, including their seaward approaches (open ocean).  
The challenge for the maritime community of interest along the Great Lakes is to 
overcome the realities of only partial geographical coverage and vessel tracking. 
Currently, for instance, vessel tracking is handled through 1) aircraft overflights (Coast 
Guard and Coast Guard Auxiliary aircraft, U.S. Air Force, Customs and Border Patrol, 
Canadian Coast Guard, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and state and local law 
enforcement aircraft), 2) government agency vessels (federal, state, local, and Canadian 
government), 3) radio direction finding (DF) capabilities resulting from mariner 
transmissions from marine-band radios, 4) tracking devices installed on target vessels 
under court or local law enforcement orders, and 5) reliance on existing Canadian shore-
based radar systems that are available to the Coast Guard Search and Rescue (SAR) 
Missions coordinator for SAR purposes. A Coast Guard VTS operating in St. Mary’s 
River monitors and guides ships through the congested confluence of Lakes Huron, 
Michigan, and Superior and the interconnecting St. Mary’s River. Additionally, a VTS-





jurisdiction of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, the private entity that 
holds many of the Captain of the Port authorities as transferred by the United States 
government prior to September 11, 2001. 
D. SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
Maritime monitoring along the Great Lakes is also limited in terms of 
enforcement against illegal immigration. Since 9/11, attention to border enforcement has 
increased on both the southern and northern borders, but along the maritime routes of the 
north, surveillance, sensors, and increased U.S. Border Patrol presence remain 
inadequate. The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is designed to improve coordination of 
DHS agency assets and resources; increase sharing of intelligence and tactical 
information; improve detection, identification, and surveillance capability; and integrate 
technology with resource allocation to target potential shifts of illegal activity as they 
become maritime threats and thus a significant concern in the nation’s ability to maintain 
complete maritime domain awareness throughout the Great Lakes system. 
DHS announced the SBI on November 6, 2006. The intent of the multiyear plan 
was to coordinate all DHS efforts to secure the nation’s borders and facilitate the legal 
entry and exit of people and the flow of legitimate commerce across all U.S. borders and 
through all authorized ports of entry. SBI calls for the integration of technology, DHS 
personnel, improved infrastructure and cooperation with state, local, and international 
partners (USDHS, 2006). While a significant focus of SBI has been on the United States–
Mexico border, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made a concerted effort 
to triple the number of U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents assigned to the United States–
Canada border and has doubled the number of CBP inspectors at the northern border 
ports of entry (USDHS, 2006). Several new USBP stations, some with marine facilities, 
have been constructed since 2005, including locations on the St. Lawrence River and the 
Niagara River that have significantly improved DHS interagency coordination and 
tactical operations while facilitating opportunities for improving cross-border 
partnerships and joint operations with International Border Enforcement Team (IBET) 
agencies.  
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To increase the opportunity for threat identification, classification, and 
interception, CPB launched the SBInet project to provide the USBP with the technology 
and infrastructure necessary to achieve border control that is functionally tailored to the 
specific terrains and challenges posed by each USBP sector (United States Customs and 
Border Patrol [USCBP], n.d.). SBInet is required to provide a solution that senses a cross- 
border entry into the United States, identifies the entry as legal or unlawful, classifies the 
threat with the number of people and armament, provides a means to respond to the entry, 
and dispatches the appropriate law enforcement solution (USCBP, n.d.). The ultimate 
goal of SBInet is to provide the common operating picture for CBP and its USBP agents 
to facilitate the interception and arrest of targets of interest. The challenge noted by 
available documentation is that, as the land borders and designated ports of entry are 
fortified through this integration of technology, infrastructure, and personnel, it is 
anticipated that threats will shift illegal entry of personnel and contraband to the ports. 
Given the minimal distances between the United States and Canada over much of the 
Great Lakes system, increased vigilance, improvements in monitoring and targeting 
capabilities, shared operational information, and coordination of homeland security assets 
and resources are necessary. 
E. NATIONAL BORDER PATROL STRATEGY 
The National Border Patrol Strategy highlights the need for improved 
coordination among agencies, consistent and trustworthy detection, identification and 
classification of entries, and a shared common operating picture. This strategy directly 
supports CBP’s strategic goals of: 1) preventing terrorism through detection and 
prevention measures, 2) strengthening the control of U.S. borders at and between 
designated ports of entry, and 3) protecting America and its citizens by prohibiting the 
introduction of illicit contraband and illegal immigrants (USCBP, n.d.). Table 1 
summarizes the Border Patrol’s five main objectives to meet CBP’s goals. 
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Table 1.   Border Patrol Objectives (Source: National Border Patrol Strategy) 
National Border Patrol Strategy—Five Main Objectives 
1. Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they 
attempt to enter illegally between the ports of entry. 
2. Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement. 
3. Detect, apprehend, and deter smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband. 
4. Leverage “Smart Border” technology to multiply the effect of enforcement personnel. 
5. Reduce crime in border communities and consequently improve quality of life and 
economic vitality of targeted areas. 
 
The northern border requires international partnerships with Canadian law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies in addition to coordination with other federal, 
state, local, and tribal organizations. Evidence of increased partnerships includes the 
increased joint presence of IBET agencies, joint staffing of the CBP fusion center on 
Grand Island, New York, the collocation of Coast Guard personnel and vessels at the 
Massena, New York, USBP station, and adjacent command locations of Coast Guard and 
USBP stations in the Thousand Islands region of the St. Lawrence River. These 
partnership and resource coordination initiatives are in full alignment with the northern 
border strategic focus of the National Border Patrol Strategy. 
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Table 2.   National Border Patrol Strategy—Northern Border Strategic Focus 
(Source: National Border Patrol Strategy) 
National Border Patrol – Strategic Focus Elements 
• Balance intelligence use, other agency liaison efforts, technology, and equipment 
use, and personnel. 
• Identify threat areas and resource requirements to mitigate and defeat threats. 
• Acquire communications and data infrastructure to support detection and 
response. 
• Expand detection technologies and sensoring platforms. 
• Improve mobility and rapid response capability. 
 
As described in this chapter, the United States has already established basic 
policies and guidance related to MDA improvements through its Maritime Security 
Policy (HSPD-13), the Coast Guard’s Maritime Sentinel Strategic Plan, Customs and 
Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative, and the National Border Patrol Strategy. 
These policies and strategies provide a foundation for expansion of MDA concepts that 
require continued refinement where detection, identification, and potential interception of 
threats cannot occur dozens of miles offshore. A critical element to successfully address 
MDA concerns on the Great Lakes is the need for binational collaboration and 
coordination between the United States and Canada due to the proximity of the shared 
border to each nation’s shore. Given the mutual use and risk of the Great Lakes, the 
protection of the maritime domain cannot be unilateral. 
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III.  COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND 
CANADA IN MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS ON THE GREAT 
LAKES 
“The almost 4,000-mile-long border between the United States and Canada is the 
longest undefended border in the world. But this boundary line has been changing—from 
one that is open and safe to one that requires increased security and policing, especially in 
light of last year’s terrorist attacks and the 1999 arrest of an Algerian national in 
possession of high explosives” (McAleavey, 2002, p. 1). This chapter will briefly 
describe the history of the undefended border, border-related security issues affecting 
both nations, and several positive steps taken to mitigate risks and improve the security 
posture of the Great Lakes system. 
Figure 1.   Chart of Great Lakes Showing International Border between the United States 
and Canada (Source: NOAA nautical chart) 
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A. HISTORY OF BORDER CONCERNS 
A host of research, data, briefings, and discussions from United States and 
Canadian sources highlight security issues and concerns resulting from a porous United 
States–Canada border. While detailed data and reports exist in classified documents, the 
generalized challenges that exist are also summarized sufficiently in unclassified 
documents and research. Challenges peculiar to the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence 
Seaway affect the ability to obtain complete MDA, including the close proximity of the 
shorelines between the United States and Canada, the sovereignty of Indian reservations, 
and the complications of the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817. 
The Rush-Bagot Agreement allows only one vessel on Lake Ontario “not 
exceeding one hundred tons burthen and armed with one eighteen pound cannon” (Rush-
Bagot Agreement of 1817). Additionally, it allows two similar vessels and armament on 
the upper lakes and one on Lake Champlain. This nearly two-hundred-year-old treaty 
requires that all other armed vessels on the Great Lakes be dismantled and that no other 
vessels of war be built or armed on the Great Lakes (Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817).  
Consultations between the United States and Canadian governments in March 
2003 concluded that “the Coast Guard vessels to be armed are law enforcement vessels 
operating domestically under the Department of Homeland Security, and are not naval 
forces under the Department of Defense. Both governments are of the view that the Rush-
Bagot Agreement was not intended to cover law enforcement vessels with the light 
armaments herein described, nor are their actions described herein contrary to the object 
and purpose of the agreement” (United States Department of State [USDOS], 2003). 
According to this pro memoria document, armament consists of M-60, .50 caliber 
machine gun, or like automatic weapons. Bruce Levy, Director, U.S. Transboundary 
Division conveyed to Nancy Mason, Director, Office of Canadian Affairs at the U.S. 
Department of State, that “although not formally falling under Rush-Bagot, we share your 
view that our discussions were consistent with the spirit and intent of the Agreement and, 




Figure 2.   Akwesasne Reservation on the St. Lawrence Seaway (Tribal lands are within 
the State of New York and the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec) 
(Source: NOAA nautical chart) 
B. BORDER ISSUES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
Peter Andreas noted that “the immediate U.S. response to the terrorist attacks 
included a dramatic tightening of border inspections and a toughening of the policy 
discourse about borders and cross-border flows” (Andreas, 2003, p. 1). He correctly 
claims that “while there has been considerable clandestine cross-border activity along the 
northern U.S. border, this has largely remained under the political radar screen as 
American border anxieties have been directed southward.… The openness of the border, 




mutual pride, but is now perceived as a source of vulnerability by the United States” 
(Andreas, 2003). However, Andreas’s assertion that “the Coast Guard now stops all boats 
crossing the Great Lakes and escorts gas and oil tankers” (Andreas, 2003) is not true. 
In 2000, the U.S. Border Patrol was unable to accurately assess the level of illegal 
activity along the northern border, due in part to shortcomings in the commonly used 
data. The 2000 assessment concluded that the border patrol was “unable to adequately 
respond to illegal activity” due to the presence of only 324 border patrol agents assigned 
to a 4,000-mile segment of the northern border. The report also found that the “northern 
border sectors lacked sufficient essential equipment, or ‘force multipliers,’ such as radios, 
cameras, sensors, and boats that could improve enforcement capabilities” (United States 
Department of Justice [USDOJ], 2002, p. 2). While “the chief patrol agents unanimously 
agreed that border control and security had become their number one priority since 
September 11, 2001,” staffing, equipment needs, and intelligence capability to support 
enforcement operations has not yet been met and is limited at best (USDOJ, 2002). 
In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services 
Committee on August 1, 2006, Captain Patrick Brennan, USCG, briefed the key issues 
and challenges regarding northern maritime border security. Captain Brennan, the 
commander of USCG Sector Detroit, claimed that the shared border with Canada poses 
both physical and jurisdictional challenges. He stated, “Unlike search and rescue 
operations during which the border is transparent, law enforcement operations involve a 
‘solid’ border which we cannot ordinarily cross between ports.… This means that on a 
frequent basis pursuit of suspect vessels must stop at the border” (Brennan, 2006). 
C. INTEGRATED CROSS-BORDER MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OPERATIONS 
Adequate border security requires cooperation between U.S. and Canadian 
agencies. One successful approach to overcoming the jurisdictional barriers is the 
Integrated Maritime Security Operation (IMSO), or “Shiprider,” that provides both the 
U.S. Coast Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) opportunities for 
joint-manning of each other’s vessels for enforcement and security operations.  
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One cannot gain an understanding of Coast Guard operations along the 
northern border without considering the fact that nearly every Coast Guard 
mission, if it is to be executed efficiently and effectively, requires some 
form of cooperation with a sister Canadian agency with similar mission.… 
Interagency cooperation for border security involves close cooperation 
between all DHS components, the FBI, State, and county resources 
through several avenues.… Another effective avenue of cooperation 
occurs through the Area Maritime Security Committees. These 
committees, and their executive bodies, provide the Federal Maritime 
Security Coordinators (FMSC) with advice on identification and 
mitigation of threats, serve as a link between law enforcement agencies 
and ship and marine terminal operators to communicate threat information 
and change Maritime Security levels (MARSEC) to respond to threats, 
and assist the FMSC with maintenance of the Area Maritime Security Plan 
(AMSP). (Brennan, 2006)  
Captain Brennan also notes that Coast Guard personnel now staff the Great 
Lakes–St. Lawrence Seaway Marine Security Operations Center, an interdepartmental 
Canadian effort designed to detect and deter threats on the maritime border (Brennan, 
2006). 
D. CANADA’S NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY POSTURE, AND 
MDA 
Since September 11, 2001, the effort of the United States to increase its security 
posture has been matched by comparable discussions and changes in Canadian homeland 
security policies, initiatives, and enforcement. Significant volumes of reports, research, 
and public discussion are available in official Canadian government documents, 
academic institutions, homeland security forums, the Canadian media, and citizen 
organization documents. 
The United States and Canada have a long history of cooperation that smoothes 
the path in these efforts. Lieutenant Commander Bruce Grissom, U.S. Navy, notes that 
“one struggle that is being faced by U.S. policy-makers is how to establish partnerships 
with our hemispheric neighbors that increase homeland security while maintaining 
borders that enhance free flow of goods and services in an ever increasing global 
economy” (Grissom, 2004, p. 1). He highlights the defensive pact established prior to 
World War II between the United States and Canada, where President Roosevelt 
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“proclaimed that the United States would not stand idly by if Canadian soil was 
threatened” (Grissom, 2004). Similarly, Canada’s Prime Minister acknowledged that 
country’s obligations to provide support should the United States be attacked. Grissom 
claims that “the NORAD agreement between the United States and Canada was driven by 
America’s desire for security in an increasingly unsure world,” referring to the creation of 
the joint US/Canadian military command in 1958 to protect both nations from Soviet 
threats (Grissom, 2004).1  
The NORAD agreement between the United States and Canada has set a 
foundation for future direct military partnerships. Technologically, Canada 
is able to procure systems that would be interoperable with U.S. 
capabilities. The only hindrance to future partnerships might be the will of 
Canadian policy-makers to partner with the United States in an area such 
as missile defense. (Grissom, 2004)  
Grissom then goes on to highlight Canada’s $29 billion reduction in defense 
spending and a 50% cut in troops over the past decade. 
Lieutenant-Commander Kearney and Lieutenant-Commander Millar, Canadian 
Naval Forces, claim that two major security concerns that affect Canadians are: 1) 
potential terrorist threats, and 2) United States unilateral action if Canadians are not 
observed to be doing “enough” to deny terrorists entry to Canada (Kearney & Millar, 
2004, p. 63). They claim that  
to meet the concerns of Canadian maritime security, and to ensure our 
ongoing cooperation with the US, Canada must be capable of effectively 
monitoring and controlling activity within our territory and the areas of the 
ocean over which we claim authority. This requires an ability to provide 
indications and warning functions, to monitor, track and analyze events 
occurring on, under, and over Canada’s three dimensional maritime 
approaches, and to share this maritime picture with the appropriate 
agencies of the government responsible for enforcing Canadian law. 
(Kearney & Millar, 2004)  
                                                 
1 NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, is a binational military command 
focused on the air defense of North America and located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. 
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Most importantly, they state, “the existing coastal Naval Operations 
Centres will need to be expanded into Maritime Fusion Centres, and an 
additional facility will need to be established for the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Seaway. These centres should be staffed utilizing a Joint 
Combined Interagency Approach to increase interagency cooperation and 
coordination” (Kearney & Millar, 2004). 
E. MULTIAGENCY AND BINATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR MDA ON 
THE GREAT LAKES SYSTEM 
Official government documents produced by both United States and Canadian 
federal agencies highlight the successes and challenges of interagency, multiagency, and 
binational partnerships. A number of approaches, including the International Border 
Enforcement Teams (IBET), Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement 
Operations, and Marine Security Operation Centers (MSOC) are currently functioning on 
the Great Lakes. 
IBETs are a multiagency, binational alliance among United States, Canadian, and 
tribal law enforcement agencies who share the mission of protecting the shared border. 
“Since September 11, IBETs have acquired sensor systems, night-vision devices, 
computers, global positioning systems, and automatic personnel and vehicle locators. But 
integrating advanced technology into IBET tactical operations is proving to be a 
challenge” (Kearney & Millar, 2004). Communications interoperability and surveillance 
continue to be issues requiring resolution. 
In a June 2002 speech, Dr. LeBeuf of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) highlighted that “partnerships between Canada and the U.S. are nothing new. 
The two countries have long been seen as partners, creating, by force of circumstances, a 
stable, natural bond for a very long time” (LeBeuf, 2002, p. 2). Quoting Archer Stephens 
(1991), he stated that “the border has not traditionally been the source of any concerns 
with respect to mutual security,” noting that “criminal justice has been a domestic issue 
because the two countries’ legal cultures varied in their respective approaches and 
philosophies” (LeBeuf, 2002). Dr. LeBeuf acknowledges that “it is conceivable to say the 
border is permeable leaving citizens on either side vulnerable not only to disease, such as 
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smallpox, but also to bioterrorism and criminality” (LeBeuf, 2002). “The security of 
Canada and the US are inextricably linked and intervulnerable” (LeBeuf, 2001, p. 3). He 
also claims the border performs revenue, regulatory, and immigration functions. 
Supporting binational partnership between Canada and the United States, he discusses the 
importance of collaborative partnerships as preferable to cooperative partnerships. 
Clarifying his concept of collaborative partnerships, he highlights the IBETs, intelligence 
sharing, and joint enforcement operations, further detailing the anticipated impacts of 
partnerships and unanticipated outcomes. 
F. U.S. AND CANADIAN BORDER POLICIES AFFECTING MDA ON THE 
GREAT LAKES 
Limited academic research exists regarding reviews and evaluations of current 
policies and practices for MDA on the Great Lakes. Even less literature was located that 
addressed the transfer of Captain of the Port authorities and MDA surveillance to the St. 
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC), a U.S. entity, and the St. 
Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation (SLSMC), a Canadian entity. A definite 
void exists regarding how the transfers of these authorities prior to September 11, 2001—
and the lack of changes since the attacks on United States soil—enhance or detract from 
homeland security and MDA for both nations. 
Lisa Seghetti notes that both the United States and Canada are striving to balance 
border security with the facilitation of legitimate cross-border travel and commerce and 
with the protection of civil liberties.  
Compared to its southern counterpart [with Mexico], the northern border 
historically has been understaffed and lacked the necessary infrastructure 
to adequately screen individuals seeking entry into the United States. 
Although the southern border has seen more illegal activities over the 
years, there has been growing concern over the insufficient number of 
personnel assigned to the northern border, the increasing amount of illegal 
activity that occurs at the northern border, and the potential for terrorists to 
sneak into the United States through the northern border.” (Seghetti, 2004, 
p. 2)  
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Seghetti briefly addresses the content and impacts of the Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, and Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Additionally, she highlights the joint measures 
taken by the United States and Canada from 1995 to present. Specifically, she identifies 
the 30-point plan referred to as the “Smart Border Accord,” the joint statement of 
cooperation on border security and migration of December 3, 2001, the Canada–U.S. 
Partnership Forum (CUSP), NEXUS, IBETs, shared facilities, preinspections, and North 
American perimeter security (Seghetti, 2004). 
On September 9, 2002, President Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Chretien 
held a joint press conference where they announced the launching of FAST, or Free and 
Secure Trade and the SMART Border initiatives. The purpose of these agreements was to 
simplify travel for people who routinely cross the international border, while increasing 
overall security through the ports of entry (White House, 2002a). Elements of the Smart 
Border Action Plan that affect the maritime border include biometric identifiers, 
permanent resident cards, ferry terminals, compatible immigration databases, 
international cooperation, clearance away from the border, joint facilities, customs data, 
in-transit container targeting at seaports, IBETs, joint enforcement coordination, 
integrated intelligence, counter-terrorism legislation, and joint training and exercises 
(White House, 2002b).  
Recently, some progress has been made regarding international cooperation for 
cross-border law enforcement operations between the United States government and the 
government of Canada. On May 26, 2009, an agreement was signed between the 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Canadian Minister of 
Public Safety to permanently establish joint-nation cross-border law enforcement 
operations, which are commonly referred to as “Shiprider.” The agreement prescribes 
specific procedures, authorities, and limitations on DHS components and Canadian law 
enforcement officers regarding maritime operations in shared waterways along the United 
States–Canada border. The purpose “is to provide the Parties additional means in shared 
waterways to prevent, detect, suppress, investigate, and prosecute criminal offenses or 
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violations of law including, but not limited to, illicit drug trade, migrant smuggling, 
trafficking of firearms, the smuggling of counterfeit goods and money, and terrorism” 
(US–Canada Framework Agreement, 2009). While each nation retains complete authority 
within its own territory, the framework clearly defines the authorities, training, custody of 
persons, vessels or things detained or seized, accountability, use of force, information 
sharing, and cooperation in investigation and law enforcement/homeland security 
proceedings. 
This review of the history of both binational collaboration and current 
partnerships between the United States and Canada provides encouraging evidence that 
steps have already been taken in the right direction to address vulnerabilities in the Great 
Lakes region. The next step is to examine the technical requirements to achieve complete 
MDA and establish a COP. 
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IV. DEFINING MDA AND COP REQUIREMENTS 
The purpose for the Coast Guard’s MDA capability is to provide superior 
knowledge to secure the homeland and sustain effective maritime operations to federal, 
state and local agencies, public and private stakeholders, and foreign governments and 
international organizations that share common risks and interests. To date, there is no 
apparent action to define a single set of operational requirements for a national common 
operating picture that fully represents the needs of all DHS and DoD components within 
the maritime domain. However, the Coast Guard has assumed the lead for the 
development of various initiatives that will bolster the national common operating picture 
with a focus on allowing for the effective collection, analysis, and dissemination of key 
information and intelligence to regional command centers, partner agencies, and 
components sharing maritime domain awareness, homeland security, law enforcement, 
and national defense missions.  
Properly established, MDA provides a series of geographic layers in which 
operations can be categorized and focused to increase the likelihood that threats and 
challenges will be detected and addressed before they become issues requiring casualty 
response (Figure 3). Differing levels of United States authority, capability, and activities 
are permitted within each layer. To be most effective, simultaneous activities must occur 
to collect, synthesize, analyze, and act on data and information from each geographic 
layer. Table 3 summarizes the geographic layers and a representative sample of the types 




Figure 3.   COP Geographic Layers for MDA (Source: USCG, 2004) 
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Table 3.   Sample Sources of Information Collection to Support Maritime Domain 
Awareness (Source: USCG, 2004) 
 
Foreign 
• Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) vessels (periodic collection) 
• AIS-equipped vessels in foreign ports (collaborative governments) 
• Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
• Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 
• Customs and Border Protection—pertinent cargo/people data 
• Port security audits 
High Seas 
• National Vessel Movement Center—Notice of Arrival 
• AIS: data collected from long range/over-the-horizon position reporting systems 
• Surface and air patrols 
• Environment / Infrastructure / Friendly Forces / Facilities: Collected from 
pertinent stakeholders 
Maritime Approaches 
• Wide-area surveillance in chokepoints and port approaches/high-density traffic 
areas (including radars and AIS) 
Coastal Approaches 
• Near real-time collection of all vessel categories near restricted changes and high-
traffic areas; near shore commercial facilities; closed areas; periodic collection 
elsewhere 
• Notice of Arrival information 
• RESCUE 21—radio direction finding 
• Coastal radar in chokepoints and port approaches 
• Underwater detection 
• NAIS—Blue Force Tracking and data from AIS-equipped vessels 
• Port, facility, and vessel security plans and assessments 
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Ports 
• Real-time collection of all vessel categories near critical infrastructure, restricted 
channels, closed areas (periodic collection elsewhere) 
• HUMINT—collected from Port Partners (proposed Interagency Operations 
Center-represented agencies) 
Waterways 
• Data collected from National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
• Existing vessel tracking systems (including Vessel Traffic Services, Inland Rivers 
Vessel Movement Center, St. Lawrence Seaway Management/Development 
Corporations 
• RADAR 
• Electro-optical/Infrared sensors from private & public sources, including digital 
photos and video 
 
The closer that vessels, maritime events, and activities are to the coast of the 
United States (see Table 3), the more definitive and comprehensive is the required 
information. The goal of MDA data and information collection is to detect vessels and 
understand their activities within 2,000 miles of the United States shoreline for the 
following reasons: 
• Identify known and probable vessel, cargo, and people threats and 
challenges; 
• Improve alignment of ship identification and transit information with 
existing 96-hour notice-of-arrival requirements; 
• Provide the time necessary to analyze data and develop a response plan 
well in advance of vessel arrival near a United States port or shoreline; 
• Capture data from vessels transiting near the United States even though 
they do not intend to enter a United States port. (USCG, 2004) 
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The balance of this chapter will summarize the critical requirements from several 
initiatives and concepts to improve maritime domain awareness, sharing of pertinent 
information, and establishment of Interagency Operations Centers. Specifically, the 
discussion will focus on defining the requirements for 1) a common operating picture, 2) 
the need for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR), 3) the Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS), 
and 4) Interagency Operations centers. 
A. COMMON OPERATING PICTURE (COP) 
In order to achieve complete MDA, all mission or functional areas of the 
components and agencies tasked with maritime homeland security functions must be 
incorporated into a common architecture that provides each with the ability to share near 
real-time information, synthesize inputs from multiple sources, and quickly analyze the 
data to effect improved decision making prior to losing the opportunity to investigate and 
act on threats identified. While there are many different formal definitions of a COP, the 
concept and intent are similar.  
The COP is a display of relevant information shared by more than one 
command. The COP provides a shared display of friendly, enemy/suspect, 
and neutral tracks on a chart, with applicable geographically referenced 
overlays and data enhancements. The COP contains a decision-maker 
toolset fed by one or more distributed and exchanged track and object 
databases. Each user can filter and contribute to these databases according 
to area of responsibility and command role. The COP environment may 
include distributed data processing, data exchange, collaboration tools, 
and communications capabilities. The COP may include information 
relevant to the tactical and strategic levels of command. This includes, but 
is not limited to, geographic information systems data, assets, activities 
and elements, planning data, readiness data, intelligence, reconnaissance 
and surveillance data, imagery, and environmental data. The COP 
facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons in achieving 
situational awareness. (United States Coast Guard [USCG], 2004) 
The COP must be all-inclusive of information and data feeds pertinent to the 
maritime domain. DHS and DoD shore, surface, and air assets, as well as assets of 
partner agencies at the state, local, and international levels of government, must be 
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represented in the COP to aid successful deployment of appropriate assets based on 
jurisdictional authorities to respond across the complete spectrum of mission sets 
represented in the maritime domain. It is critical that the COP accept information from a 
multitude of sensors and inputs owned or collected by a myriad of sources, especially 
those of government components or agencies with maritime responsibilities. Since the 
COP must serve multiple government organizations of varying authorities and 
responsibilities, the COP must provide all operational commanders with the information 
needed to make sound decisions (Table 4). Additionally, the COP must 1) inform 
operational commanders of strategic implications to mission success; 2) exchange 
strategic, operational, and tactical information with supporting interagency organizations; 
3) effectively plan, execute, and evaluate multiple mission events; and 4) effectively 
interface with DHS, DoD, DOJ, state, local, and tribal partners to satisfy maritime 
homeland security, homeland defense, and law enforcement mission requirements 
(United States Coast Guard [USCG], 2004). To achieve these requirements, COP 
capabilities can be organized into nine top level functional requirements as summarized 
in Table 5. 
Table 4.   Nine Categories of Information Required for Maritime Domain Awareness 
(Source:  USCG, 2004) 
 
Table 5.   Top-Level COP Requirements (Functional Areas) (Source: USCG, 2008a)  
 33
 
B. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, 
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (C4ISR) 
C4ISR systems provide the foundation upon which an effective MDA COP must 
be built. These systems provide operators, analysts, and decision makers with essential 
situational awareness, data processing, and information exchange tools integral to 
mission performance. These systems are comprised of three components that form the 
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basis of the network backbone upon which the COP will operate. These components 
include: 
1) Command and Control (C2) systems: Provide core decision-making tools 
to rapidly collect and process extraordinary amounts of uncorrelated data 
and information from multiple sources. Resulting data solutions and 
interconnected data networks facilitate the review and merger of disparate 
information to direct unified and often worldwide actions (USCG, 2009). 
2) Communications, Computers, and Information Technology (C4IT) 
elements: Provide the network infrastructure, including the data storage, 
enterprise service bus, data processing, and information analysis tools, and 
hardware and software components, displays, and graphical user interfaces 
that allow personnel to input and manipulate data, collate and analyze 
information, and generate intelligence for strategic and tactical decision 
making. 
3)  Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Refers to data collection through the 
use of available sensors to locate, identify, and observe vessels, persons, 
and threats (USCG, 2009). 
Each C4ISR element is essential to form a networked system that allows for the 
immediate conversion of relevant mission information into appropriate decisions and 
tactical mission activities. When advanced sensor data is fused with mission-planning 
information from multiple sources and various port partners, federal/state/local agencies, 
and foreign nations, then decision makers and joint stakeholders are better able to rapidly 
gather, analyze, and exchange secure and unambiguous information and intelligence. 
The requirements for a functional C4ISR infrastructure include: 
• Capability to provide operational commanders with sufficiently detailed 
information and intelligence to make sound and timely decisions; 
• Ability to rapidly inform executive leadership of strategic implications to 
mission success; 
• Ability to rapidly exchange strategic, operational, and tactical information 
and intelligence with supporting commands, components, and agencies; 
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• Ability to effectively plan, execute, and evaluate multiple mission events; 
• Ability to effectively interface with DHS, DoD, state, local, and tribal 
partners to satisfy joint and individual mission requirements; and 
• Ability to effectively incorporate intelligence community–derived data 
and analyses into C4ISR systems to support planning and operations at the 
component/agency level as well as joint activities. (USCG, 2009) 
A critical aspect of C4ISR infrastructure is to create a system of sensors that 
allows for persistent surveillance:  
Persistence means that when global, theater, or local reconnaissance finds 
something of intelligence or actionable interest, ISR systems, including 
processing and analytic systems, maintain constant, enduring contact with 
the contact. This increases the understanding about the target, which 
enables a faster decision cycle at all levels of command and supports the 
application of precision force to achieve desired effects. (Pendall, 2005, 
p. 41)  
Persistent surveillance utilizes a variety of sensor technologies, whether manned, 
unmanned, remotely operated, fixed or radio frequency to integrate with a human 
interface that allows for the application of judgment and experience to enable decision 
making while mitigating risks. Continuous surveillance through a myriad of sensors 
within the ports and waterways, including long-range vessel tracking and identification 
systems such as the Nationwide Automatic Identification System, provides 
unprecedented opportunities to collect, collate, synthesize, and adjudicate information 
and intelligence in the maritime domain. To the maximum degree possible, automation of 
anomaly detection is critical in order to alert operation centers of potential threats or 
targets of interest requiring additional scrutiny. 
While persistent vessel tracking capability currently exists in discrete areas where 
the Coast Guard maintains Vessel Tracking Services (VTS), the ability to track is 
primarily accomplished via radar and vessel radio reports, relying heavily on voice 
communications to associate vessel identity and radar images. Additional information on 
the vessel (e.g., cargo, course, and speed) is gathered by or verified by watchstanders 
where limited shore-based AIS coverage exists (USCG, 2005). In near-coastal areas, 
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Coast Guard and other agency or component vessels and aircraft patrols—and other 
means of collecting vessel location information, including self-reporting by ships—only 
provide “snapshot” surveillance. Continual vessel position and destination information, 
course and speed, vessel identification, and other information is critical to assessing 
potential threats posed by vessels and to protecting vessels while in transit. Vessel 
tracking information must be correlated with other sensors and databases to aid in 
anomaly detection, identify innocent vessels from targets of interest, and give decision 
makers accurate and timely information to allocated resources for increased surveillance 
and/or interception (USCG, 2005). 
C. NATIONWIDE AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (NAIS) 
To gain a complete understanding of activities occurring in the maritime 
environment requires detailed real-time or near real-time information about vessels 
operating in the maritime domain, particularly vessel location and identity. The ability to 
detect, classify, identify, and track vessels is the foundation upon which other 
information can be added. By combining and correlating vessel information (e.g., 
activities, origins, itinerary) decision makers can assess the vessel’s intentions and 
activities in relation to its operating area and better determine what, if any, action should 
be taken (USCG, 2005). 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) established Automatic 
Identification System protocols for three reasons: 1) as a collision avoidance tool; 2) as a 
tool for vessel traffic services; and 3) as a means for coastal states to get information on 
vessels operating near their coasts (USCG, 2005). In 2000, the IMO “adopted a new 
requirement for all ships to carry an AIS transceiver capable of providing information 
about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically” (Watts, 2006). 
Effective no later than December 31, 2004, the IMO regulation “requires AIS to be fitted 
aboard all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages, 
cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages, and 
all passenger ships irrespective of size.… Ships fitted with AIS shall maintain AIS in 
operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide 
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for the protection of navigational information” (Watts, 2006). This AIS standard and 
protocol was adopted by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 (46 
U.S.C. 70114). NAIS will leverage the AIS technology and international communication 
standards as the basis for vessel tracking and the exchange of safety and security 
information with AIS-equipped vessels. 
The international regulations require that AIS shall: 
• Provide information—including the ship’s identity, type, position, course, 
speed, navigational status and other safety-related information—
automatically to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships and 
aircraft; 
• Receive automatically such information from similarly fitted ships;  
• Monitor and track ships; and, 
• Exchange data with shore-based facilities. (Watts, 2006) 
The international regulation, coupled with the AIS standard and protocol as 
addressed in MTSA 2002, provides the basis for the establishment of NAIS. Based on 
early surveys of representative users who would be directed to utilize the NAIS in their 
daily operations, the Coast Guard identified the following essential MDA tasks that could 
be partially or fully supported by NAIS: 
• Monitor all vessels and other craft in the Marine Environment all the time; 
• Monitor all cargo in the Marine Environment all the time; 
• Monitor all identified areas of interest in the Marine Environment all the 
time; 
• Access and maintain data on facilities and infrastructure in the Marine 
Environment; 
• Collect, analyze, and disseminate information on the Marine Environment 
to decision makers to facilitate understanding. (Watts, 2006) 
•  
Additionally, NAIS capability will provide the following operational functions: 
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• Receipt and transmission of AIS information in order to detect, identify, 
monitor and track AIS-equipped vessels and to communicate data to and 
from shoreside and shipboard AIS equipment. 
• Network services to enable conveyance of data between shoreside AIS 
equipment, processing equipment and command and control (C2) systems 
and interoperability with such systems. 
• Data management capabilities, including data processing, recording, 
retrieval, warehousing and analysis. 
• Interoperability and interface with a variety of C2 systems, including user 




Table 6.   Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) High-Level 
Performance Specifications (Source: USCG, 2008b) 
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As currently designed, NAIS will provide the capability to receive vessel 
information from 50 nautical miles, transmit to a distance of 24 nautical miles from 
shore, and address the requirements contained in Table 6. This current planned capability 
increases the existing AIS coverage by more than 400% and fills the capabilities gap for 
transmit and blue-force tracking functionality. Future plans for NAIS include the 
extension of AIS receiver coverage to a distance of 2,000 nautical miles from the U.S. 
shore (see Figure 4). Technology feasibility studies are currently underway and include 
the use of satellite-based AIS coverage, offshore AIS relays, and commercial AIS 
subscriptions. However, the NAIS solution does not currently include plans to provide 
the necessary GUI for operators to fully utilize the functionality that is inherent in the 
system architecture currently under development. Providing the user access to 
functionality provided by NAIS, as well as other C2 systems, is the basis for creating 
Interagency Operations Centers.2 
                                                 
2 Reference documents are personal inter-office communications of the NAIS Project Resident Office 
and Project Management Office. 
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Figure 4.   Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) Operational View 
(Source: NAIS Project Resident Office) 
D. INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS 
Following the 9/11 attacks, major maritime safety and security gaps were 
identified by the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
United States Congress. The identified gaps highlighted a lack of: “(1) basic awareness of 
vessel activities near vulnerable port and coastal infrastructure; (2) systems linking the 
ever-increasing volume of vessel information in ways that help decision makers 
determine threat and develop the correct course of action; and (3) infrastructure for 
effective information sharing and joint operations with port partners” (USCG, 2010). To 
address these gaps, the Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE Port) Act of 
2006 provided the following mandate: 
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The Secretary shall establish interagency operational centers for port 
security at high-priority ports not later than 3 years after the date of the 
enactment of the SAFE Port Act. (SAFE Port Act of 2006) 
The U.S. Coast Guard assumed a key leadership role for the Department of 
Homeland Security and commenced the development of the Interagency Operations 
Centers Concept of Operations with a corresponding operational requirements document 
to start the major systems acquisition process. 
While ongoing interagency coordination is conducted in U.S. ports, the process in 
most is conducted on an ad hoc basis. A field survey of Customs and Border Protection 
(CPB) and Coast Guard personnel conducted in 2007 by the Coast Guard’s Research and 
Development Center identified significant obstacles to interagency coordination. Of 
particular note were 1) the distances between field offices, 2) poor collaboration tools, 
and 3) lack of collaboration procedures (USCG, 2010). Additionally, available gap 
analyses reiterate the need for AIS and shore-based sensors to enable persistent 
surveillance in the ports and approaches. 
The creation of Interagency Operations Centers (IOCs) is intended to improve and 
facilitate the daily interaction, training, planning, exercise, and execution of maritime 
safety and security missions within the ports by centrally accommodating federal, state, 
local, private sector, and congressionally mandated committee representatives in a single 
operational center that is designed to enhance interagency collaboration (Table 7). 
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Table 7.   Representative Port Partners by Category for IOC Membership (Source: 
USCG Commandant (CG-761)) 
 
The goal of the IOCs is to develop a proactive security posture that combines 
integrated vessel targeting, interagency operational planning, and operational monitoring 
capabilities. IOC membership efforts will be united with the following principles: 
• Early identification and/or interdiction of maritime threats, violations of 
law and maritime transportation security incidents; 
• Interagency assessment of risk regarding vessels, people or cargo moving 
through high-priority ports by the application and understanding of fused 
intelligence products, federal, state and local security concerns, and local 
crime trends; 
• Improved awareness of maritime activity within high-priority ports or 
other vulnerable areas shared with all IOC members; 
• Positive control of high-risk vessels, people or cargo; and 
• Maximum operational transparency and coordination among IOC 
members. (USCG, 2010) 
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These principles can be achieved by integrating intelligence, jointly identifying 
and mitigating risks, and coordinating responses. 
Figure 5.   Interagency Operations Center Community Model (Source: USCG, 2010) 
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E. INTEGRATING THE REQUIREMENTS 
As noted, MDA is a concept that requires a complete comprehension of all 
vessels, people, and cargo transiting in or near U.S. waters with the goal of understanding 
vessel activity to a distance of 2,000 nautical miles from the U.S. shore. To effectively 
accomplish MDA, a myriad of sensors must be leveraged to reach a state of persistent 
surveillance of all vessels, people, and cargo contained in the maritime environment. 
While various HF radio-based, visual, and electronic methods of surveillance and 
communication exist, fully instituting the internationally recognized AIS protocols and 
technologies through the Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) is critical 
to the long-range tracking of vessels and allowing for two-way ship-to-shore and vessel-
to-vessel communications. Additionally, the encryption capabilities that will be inherent 
in the “blue force tracking” functions of NAIS will equip the port partner representatives 
of the Interagency Operations Centers to better coordinate intelligence collection, 
targeting, and response activities while minimizing premature announcement of 
interception plans to unsuspecting targets. The Congressional mandate to establish IOCs 
as directed in the SAFE Port Act of 2006 is critical to a successful acquisition strategy as 
detailed specifications and appropriation justification documents are prepared for future 
funding in the federal budget process. While port-specific operating procedures must be 
developed based on each port’s partner matrix, unique threats, asset and resources 
availability, and geography and climate considerations, the concept of establishing joint 
protocols, tools, and processes to maximize interagency collaboration with the private 
sector and congressionally mandated maritime/environmental committees is critical to 
long-term mission success. 
Currently, separate and distinct planning and development efforts for the COP, 
C4ISR, NAIS, and IOCs are occurring independently and somewhat isolated from each 
other. While each initiative is a step in the right direction to meet the intent expressed in 
HSPD-13 and the SAFE Port Act of 2006, the greatest value to improving the homeland 
security posture across the Great Lakes northern border is to completely integrate these 
projects with others that may be under development by other DHS agencies or state or 
local governments and with the capabilities available from the Canadian government. 
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Technological solutions should have sufficient open architecture to allow for total 
integration of C4ISR and various sensor applications with NAIS and existing MDA 
databases that will maximize the decision-making and coordination activities at the 
interagency operations centers. 
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V. MDA MODELS 
Several multi-dimensional operational models have been developed that allow for 
collaborative command functions across multiple agencies and permit the integration of 
multiple sensors into a command and control suite, thereby facilitating fusion of data and 
information to improve intelligence collection and decision making. While much of the 
available material is proprietary, sensitive, or classified, the following discussion outlines 
the key characteristics of several models for multiagency maritime security and safety 
operations suites that could be applied to meet the requirements discussed in Chapter IV. 
A. EXAMPLE 1—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—THE GOLDWATER-
NICHOLS ACT OF 1986 
For most of the history of the United States, the armed forces were unique and 
autonomous as they trained, prepared for, and carried out the president’s direction for 
national security and defense. Each branch of the armed services set its own policy, 
established operational plans, and acquired war-fighting capabilities and equipment based 
on the needs and mission roles ascribed to its branch of service. James Locher III noted 
that “the Army and Navy were not able to solve their differences during World War II. 
Afterward, Congress settled the dispute in terms broadly favorable to the Navy’s 
concepts—ones that preserved Navy and Marine Corps independence more than they met 
the requirements of modern warfare. Despite reported operational setbacks over the next 
forty years, subsequent reorganization efforts offered only slight improvements” (Locher, 
2001). As addressed by Arizona Senator Goldwater and Alabama Representative Nichols, 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 set the stage for significant changes to the defense 
command and control structure to improve collaboration among the services. The 
legislation specifically addressed multiple issues, but it achieved four primary results: it 
1) improved military advice to the president, National Security Council, and Secretary of 
Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 2) assigned clear responsibilities for unified 
and mission-specific combatant commands; 3) increased attention on force-wide, inter- 
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service strategic and contingency planning to ensure more efficient use of defense 
resources; and 4) established a firm expectation for joint operations and interoperability 
among the service components (Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986). 
A key element of command and control was resolved by Goldwater-Nichols 
through the creation of an unquestionable line of authority and the formation of a 
governing body that consisted of the key stakeholders for national defense. The 
legislation bestowed clear and distinct authorities on the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, elevating this position to serve as the key advisor to the president on all military 
issues, concerns, and strategic recommendations. Each Department of Defense service 
was assigned a peer role in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As originally required by the 
National Security Act of 1947, the Goldwater-Nichols Act reiterated the function of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide 1) unified strategic direction to combatant forces, 2) 
operation under unified command, and 3) integration into an efficient team of land, naval, 
and air forces (Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986). Collectively, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
with advice from the commandant of the Coast Guard when appropriate, provide a force-
wide perspective to the defense and security of United States interests, addressing all 
domains of concern (maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace). 
Acting on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president creates combatant 
commands responsible to conduct military missions in the assigned theater of operations. 
Unified combatant commands are composed of forces from two or more military 
services; they have most recently been thoroughly exercised through Northern Command, 
Central Command, Southern Command, European Command, and African Command. 
The establishment of unified commands recognizes the distinct capabilities, expertise, 
and training offered by each service component, and it serves to build a joint operational 
force that synergizes the capabilities across all domains to neutralize or dominate all 
threats. The significance of the unified combatant commands is that all authority across 
all force components is placed in one individual with a staff made up of all services to 
advise, plan, and execute assigned missions. 
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A major focus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified combatant commands is 
joint strategic and contingency planning. The integrated use of capabilities, personnel, 
and resources is stressed to capitalize on the skills, expertise, and equipment that each 
service maintains in its inventory. Leveraging the strengths of each component increases 
the probability of mission success while strengthening the collaboration and trust among 
those charged with mission execution. Additionally, joint planning establishes a 
framework for the assignment of each service’s assets to contingency plans that facilitate 
joint-service training exercises, improving confidence and cooperation prior to 
operational deployment. 
The common theme throughout the Goldwater-Nichols Act is mutuality and 
interoperability among the armed forces. To achieve the fullness of this mandate, the 
Department of Defense established consistent acquisitions policies and procedures across 
the department, rather than leaving defense systems acquisitions solely at the discretion 
of the service chief. Current DOD policy requires that “capability needs and acquisition 
management systems shall use Joint Concepts, integrated architectures, and an analysis of 
doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and 
facilities in an integrated, collaborative process to define needed capabilities to guide the 
development of affordable systems” (United States Department of Defense [USDOD], 
2008). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) oversees this guidance by 
ensuring that all components’ requirements are fully defined and integrated to ensure a 
complete, interoperable defense system. Additionally, section 1251 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2008 amended Title 10 U.S.C. § 2350a(e) to require an 
analysis of potential opportunities for international cooperation for all Acquisition 
Category I programs before the first milestone decision point.3 
                                                 
3 Acquisition Category I (ACAT I / ID) programs are Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) 
estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) to 
require eventual expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $365 million 
(Fiscal Year 2000 constant dollars) or procurement of more than $2.19 billion (Fiscal Year 2000 constant 
dollars). Defense Acquisition University Glossary, 13th ed., November 2009. 
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In summary, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established very clear 
responsibilities and authorities of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that a 
joint recommendation is provided to the president or delegated defense decision maker. 
Each chief of staff is directly responsible to ensure that the functional needs, capabilities, 
and resource requirements of all services are represented to ensure mutuality and 
interoperability in all operational domains. To properly prepare and equip the military 
forces, unified commands support the Joint Chiefs of Staff by ensuring that all strategic 
and contingency plans address the full spectrum of requirements for military operations 
with the collective assets and resources available to confront any threat or execute any 
mission. These joint plans form the basis for developing joint requirements for military 
acquisitions that focus on capabilities to meet all operational needs with complete 
interoperability between all armed forces across all domains. 
B. EXAMPLE 2: PROJECT SEAHAWK—CHARLESTON HARBOR 
OPERATIONS CENTER 
Since its inception in 2003, Project SeaHawk has served as a model of 
multijurisdictional interagency collaboration between federal, state, and local port 
partners; it was cited as an example of the IOC directive mandated in the SAFE Port Act 
of 2006 (SAFE Port Act of 2006). Located in Charleston, South Carolina, the Charleston 
Harbor Operations Center—or SeaHawk—provides a comprehensive port security 
solution that leverages the unique resources and information of all participating agencies 
into a single unified command structure to provide a holistic view of the port of 
Charleston.  
When Congress authorized the establishment of the SeaHawk task force in the 
Fiscal Year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, it reiterated previous expectations for a 
fundamental mutuality and interoperability among operational forces to enable the flow 
of information and intelligence, promote interagency cooperation, and facilitate a systems 
approach to acquiring security and defense capabilities and to preparing operational 
doctrine (Beeson, 2007). As noted by the Project Seahawk task force, these expectations 
(of unity of effort among federal, state, and local agencies charged with various security 
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mandates in a single port) aligned with the previous expectations of unity of command, 
mutuality, and interoperability established for the Department of Defense components 
under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (USDOJ, n.d.). Thus, a unified command 
structure, interoperability among assets and equipment, interagency collaboration, shared 
utilization of limited resources, and compilation of information into corroborated 
intelligence were foundational in the SeaHawk construct. 
Project SeaHawk fully integrates the staff, financial resources, and assets into a 
consolidated, collaborative, unified command structure that provides round-the-clock 
safety and security to the port of Charleston. More than 40 distinct entities form the 
unified command, each bringing unique expertise, equipment, information, and 
intelligence to bear (Table 8). The task force director is assigned by the U.S. Department 
of Justice, which established a unified command structure utilizing the principles and 
guidance of the universally recognized Incident Command System (ICS). Each functional 
area is staffed by representatives of the member agencies to ensure consistency in plans, 
exercises, emergency response, and law enforcement activities throughout the port. The 
cross-pollination of the various federal, state, and local agencies has closed significant 
jurisdictional gaps by providing a full-spectrum situational-awareness approach that 
facilitates joint operations and coordination of resources to address prevention and 
response mission activities. The collaborative environment of the unified command 
structure increased efficiencies in the fusion of information to form actionable 
intelligence, resulting in key decision makers from the responsible agencies being able to 
target and mitigate risks, or to intercept and disrupt threats throughout the port. 
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Utilizing various command, control, communications, computers, and information 
technology (C4IT) applications, the participating agencies are able to combine various 
data streams into a single port-centric common operating picture providing complete 
situational awareness across jurisdictional boundaries. Data and information from various 
sources combine to form a joint information portal containing law enforcement, 
intelligence, and proprietary information to increase the visibility of potential threats or 
targets requiring further screening, investigation, and possibly interrogation. Integrated 
with Northrop Grumman’s Hawkeye sensor array, all available data is combined in a 
manner that allows watchstanders to conduct surveillance activities through a multitude 
of sensors, including radar, video, infrared, and AIS.4 SeaHawk’s culture, C4IT systems, 
                                                 
4 Interview of April 15, 2010, with Mr. Tom Fagre, Northrop Grumman Corporation, lead system 
engineer for the Hawkeye system. 
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and unified command structure equip decision makers to efficiently and promptly assign 
resources that meet the requirements of any threat, concern, mission, or exercise that 
might occur in the port of Charleston. 
C. EXAMPLE 3: MARINE SECURITY OPERATION CENTRE (MSOC) 
In June 2002, the Canadian Department of Defence initiated the Maritime 
Operational Surveillance Information Centres (MOSIC) project to expand the capabilities 
and functions of existing Canadian Navy facilities to improve the navy’s intelligence 
collection, management, and dissemination abilities. The project focused on developing 
an integrated information system that would transform the navy’s approach to 
“collecting, managing, storing, displaying and sharing maritime intelligence surveillance 
and reconnaissance information and data” (Government of Canada, 2005).  
Building on the MOSIC concept, an MSOC project scope statement noted that the 
“Government of Canada’s inter-agency and interdepartmental marine intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capability is based on business processes, information 
technology infrastructure and personnel resources developed to meet specific individual 
agency or departmental mandates. International and domestic events have highlighted the 
need for more inter-agency and interdepartmental collaboration and interoperability and 
thus are directing changes to the way we develop marine situational awareness in general; 
and to the way we plan and carry out responsibilities to marine security threats in 
particular” (Government of Canada, 2005). To address this area of concern, the Canadian 
government established Marine Security Operation Centres (MSOCs) to “enable agencies 
and departments to work collaboratively to prepare and distribute consistent, timely and 
trustworthy inter-agency and interdepartmental marine intelligence, information and data 
to national, provincial, local and international agencies. These agencies will integrate the 
marine intelligence, information and data into the total situational awareness picture that 
will be used by decision-makers to resolve marine security threats” (Government of 
Canada, 2005). As recently as 2005, official Canadian project documentation highlighted 
that “the process of integrating or fusing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
information, data and products to generate situational awareness in the maritime realm in 
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near real time is non-existent to a large extent due to technical and/or format 
incompatibility, personnel and procedural impediments, policy constraints and lack of 
fusion tools” (Government of Canada, 2005). Expanding on the two existing Department 
of National Defence Maritime Intelligence and Data Fusion Centres located in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia, and Esquimalt, British Columbia, the Canadian government recognized the 
importance of establishing a coherent, cohesive, and robust maritime security posture that 
extended beyond its military forces.  
To meet the mandate of Canada’s national security policy in April 2004 
(Government of Canada, 2004), various agencies of the government, including the 
Department of National Defence, had to reevaluate their existing intelligence collection, 
surveillance, integration, and dissemination policies. Addressing several key strategic 
areas (Table 9), a six-point plan called for improving transportation security, specifically 
marine security (Table 10). Significantly, national security policy specifically stated that 
staffing of each Marine Security Operation Centre (MSOC), would include personnel 
from Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), 
Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and 
Transport Canada (Government of Canada, 2004). 
 
Table 9.   Canadian Strategic Security Activities (Source: Government of Canada, 
2004) 
Canadian Strategic Security Needs 
Intelligence 
Emergency Planning and Management 






Table 10.   Canadian Transport Security—Marine Security 6-Point Plan (Source: 
Government of Canada, 2004) 
Transport Security: Marine Security 6-Point Plan 
1. Clarify responsibilities and strengthen co-ordination of marine 
security efforts 
2. Establish networked marine security operations centres 
3. Increase the Canadian Forces, RCMP, and Canadian Coast Guard on-
water presence and Department of Fisheries and Oceans aerial 
surveillance 
4. Enhance secure fleet communications 
5. Pursue greater marine security co-operation with the United States 
6. Strengthen the security of marine facilities 
 
Each MSOC is to provide maritime situational awareness along Canada’s coasts 
and detect, assess, and respond to marine security threats that could adversely impact 
Canada’s safety, security, environment, or economy (Table 11). Threats include emerging 
terrorist activity, over-fishing, pollution, and foreign transnational organized crime (e.g., 
drug trafficking, piracy, human smuggling). The goal is to provide a physical and 
organizational structure that facilitates marine situational awareness by transforming and 
fusing marine intelligence and operations information and data collected by partner 
agencies and departments into a common operational picture or single source of complete 
situational awareness.  
Headed by Canadian Forces Maritime Command, the centres will include 
staff from CBSA, Transport Canada, the RCMP, and the Canadian Coast 
Guard. Reflecting the approach the Canadian Forces and Canadian Coast 
Guard take to carry out search and rescue operations, these Marine 
Security Operations Centres will have the authority and capacity, through 
interagency staffing, to bring to bear all civilian and military resources 
necessary to detect, assess, and respond to a marine security threat. Marine 
Security Operations Centres will be networked with the Coast Guard’s 
vessel traffic and communications systems, and with the new Government 
Operations Centre in Ottawa. (Government of Canada, 2004)  
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As the MSOCs develop, “inputs into the centres would include everything 
from surveillance assets (aircraft, ships, terrestrial radar and space-based 
systems) to electronic vessel locator feeds, at sea weather reports and 
internet provided marine vessel information services” (Government of 
Canada, 2005).  
Table 11.   MSOC Core Functions (Source: Government of Canada, 2005) 
Marine Security Operation Centre Core Functions 
1. Manage collection of all marine information and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance data 
2. Analyze marine information and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance data 
3. Archive marine information and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance data 
4. Generate marine information and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance products including the recognized marine picture 
5. Exchange marine intelligence, information, and data with appropriate 
agencies and senior decision makers 
6. Provide marine intelligence, information, and data inputs to the 
Government of Canada Agency and Departmental Command Structures 
7. Bring to bear all civilian and military resources necessary to respond to a 
marine security threat within the framework of the national emergency 
response structure 
D. EXAMPLE 4: NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 
(NORAD)—US NORTHERN COMMAND (USNORTHCOM) 
Established by formal agreement between Canada and the United States in 1958, 
NORAD is a binational command that centralizes operational control of air defense for 
the North American continent. The 1996 agreement renewal redefined NORAD’s 
missions to include aerospace warning and control for North America with a mechanism 
for aerospace defense cooperation and provisions for binational management of 
operations and decision-making. Aerospace warning includes monitoring man-made 
objects in space and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North 
America by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles. Additionally, NORAD was given  
 
 
direction to assist civil authorities of both nations to detect and monitor aircraft suspected 
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of illegal drug trafficking (North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD], 
n.d.).  
In April 2006, the agreement was further amended to address monitoring and 
response to threats from “non-state actors or terrorist groups that might choose to 
challenge North American security, the symmetry and asymmetry of the weapons and 
methods they could employ, and the transnational grid and global nature of these threats” 
(Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Canada [NORAD agreement], 2006). The missions of NORAD were 
updated to provide 1) aerospace warning, 2) aerospace control, and 3) maritime warning 
for North America. Aerospace warning was updated to reflect the needs for processing, 
assessing, and disseminating intelligence and information for threats in the aerospace 
domain. Aerospace control provides binational authority to provide surveillance and 
positive operational control of U.S. and Canadian air space when the need arises. Lastly, 
the recent addition of maritime warning directs NORAD to process, assess, and 
disseminate intelligence and information for maritime areas and internal waterways, 
including maritime approaches, of the United States and Canada. Utilizing mutual 
support agreements with other commands and agencies, NORAD will warn responsible 
agencies of maritime threats or attacks enabling the identification, validation, and 
response by national commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and 
security (NORAD agreement, 2006). NORAD’s Vision 2020 acknowledges this mandate 
by establishing the goal to “provide timely, accurate maritime warning of threats to, and 
attacks against North America” with the intent to establish and nurture effective 
partnerships with appropriate organizations and agencies to help “ensure the necessary 
awareness of the maritime domain” (NORAD agreement, 2006). 
NORAD and USNORTHCOM utilize the model of mutuality and unity of 
command framed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The unified command structure 
staffs each directorate with members of all five U.S. armed services in addition to 
Canadian military personnel as appropriate. Joint Publication 3-08 sets a doctrinal basis 
for interagency coordination, intergovernmental organization and multinational 
operations (Table 12). Effective interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and 
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nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination cannot rely on the traditional 
command and control philosophy utilized for military operations. Conflicting goals, 
authorities, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques may challenge 
collaborative efforts. Decision-making and planning processes for non-DOD agencies, 
IGOs, and NGOs are not always as detailed or rigid as those inherent in military 
organizations. To achieve a unity of effort, it is critical that strategic goals are clearly 
stated with detailed specific objectives and mutually accepted roles and rules for 
interaction to establish trust and understanding among agencies and organizations. 
Table 12.   Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental 
Organization Coordination (Source: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff [USJCS], 
2006. 
 
To facilitate coordination among agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector, 
NORAD-USNORTHCOM established a Directorate of Interagency Coordination. This 
directorate provides interagency context to decision-making processes, anticipates 
requests for assistance through the National Response Plan (NRP) framework, and 
provides interagency situational awareness, assessments, and synthesis of interagency 
information to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM commander and agency representatives. In 
practice, this directorate attempts to anticipate gaps and seams between DOD and 
represented agencies to maximize collaboration and cooperation across the spectrum of 
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agencies, IGOs, and NGOs before mobilizing for actual response operations 
(Nightingale, 2006). 
E. EXAMPLE 5 (TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS) 
1. Harbor and Coastal Surveillance (HCS)—Northrop Grumman 
Corporation 
Harbor Coastal Surveillance (HCS) is a Northrop Grumman sensor integration 
suite that 
Integrates off-the-shelf computers, communications, and sensors with 
sensor processing and MDA databases to form a flexible, standard based, 
service oriented architecture that supports the automated collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of essential information for: (1) coastal 
surveillance and security; (2) port and harbor security; (3) vessel traffic 
management; (4) critical infrastructure protection; (5) anti-terrorist force 
protection; and (6) interdiction and response. (Northrop Grumman, n.d.) 
Built on a commercial variant of the Global Command and Control Systems 
(GCCS) architecture, HCS provided extensive sensor-based persistent surveillance 
capabilities by integrating vessel Automatic Identification System (AIS) communications 
data, radar surveillance, and video and infrared feeds into a single command and control 
system with a common graphical interface and display.  
Active sources of information from multiple sensors and data streams are 
correlated and cross-referenced against substantial vessel databases that include vessel 
characteristics, ownership, owner, cargo, and voyage information. Multisource 
correlation aids decision makers in identifying targets of interest for further research, 
investigation, and possible interdiction. Vessel data, including real-time position, course, 
and speed, along with the data from the various correlated databases, is depicted on a 
chart-based interactive display, thereby providing interagency watchstanders with full 
and complete situational awareness of the port or maritime domain. The COP provided 
by HCS tethers vessel tracks to a set of MDA data, thereby identifying vessels, their 
intended movement, associated owners and crew, and cargo. Target-of-interest and 
anomaly-detection rules can be created to evaluate vessel tracks against geographic 
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regions, security or safety zones, outputs from data queries, and vessel and transit profiles 
contained within the associated databases and shared agency information sources. HCS 
can be adapted through tailoring of hardware, sensor, and software configurations to meet 
desired functionality and is completely scalable to allow for stand-alone systems or full 
utilization as a multi-layered (local port—regional fusion center—national COP), 
multimission support system, including full use of encrypted AIS (EAIS) or blue-force 
tracking. HCS was designed using open-systems architecture to allow for complete 
interoperability and integration with DOD, USCG, and Interoperable C41 Services 
software products used by coalition partners. Additionally, HCS is customizable and 
supports TCP/IP and web service interfaces to provide interoperability with military and 





Figure 6.   HCS Web Client Home Page5 
2. Project Athena—Raytheon 
In 2005, USNORTHCOM, USBP, and Raytheon tested Raytheon’s Project 
Athena multisensor system in an interagency, binational environment along Lake 
Ontario. The objectives were to “(1) provide information and intelligence on the void of 
knowledge regarding illicit narcotics trafficking, (2) detection and disruption of terrorist 
attacks against U.S. interests, and (3) detection and apprehension of U.S. immigration 
law violators” (USDOD, 2005). The operational concept placed two sensor packages 
                                                 
5 Yellow indicates vessels transmitting current AIS data but the vessel track has not yet been 
identified. Vessels with names have been identified from the database but track information is not 
contained within the MDA database. Yellow vessels with numbers have yet to be identified. Blue indicates 
“blue-force” vessel. Red vessels indicate potential targets of interest due to anomaly in transit and/or 
database information. Green vessels mean the vessel’s AIS data matched all information contained in the 
vessel databases. 
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consisting of radars and optical and infrared cameras on the Lake Ontario shore. Athena 
integrated these sensors with tracking beacons, AIS, and weather data feeds into the COP. 
Athena fused the data and vessel information to track more than 300 targets 
simultaneously. Timely tactical decisions were made by the multiagency task force 
representing federal, state, local, and Canadian homeland security and law enforcement. 
Targeting of anomalies provided interdiction opportunities for law enforcement units 
(Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7.   Project Athena (Source: USBP unclassified briefing slide)6 
                                                 
6 Green squares represent vessels whose voyage started and ended in the U.S. Purple “plus signs” are 
vessels that started and ended in Canada. Red diamonds are potential targets of interest that crossed the 
international border. 
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F. CONVERGENCE OF MODELS 
These six models share common threads of interoperability, mutuality of mission 
planning, exercise and execution, and the sharing of data and information to allow for 
fusion into strategic and tactical intelligence useable either independently by the 
responsible jurisdiction or in coordinated efforts. Specifically, the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
establishes a framework for U.S. federal agency interoperability and joint mission focus. 
Project SeaHawk demonstrates a port-centric collaborative partnership among federal, 
state, and local agencies and jurisdictions. The MSOC provides a similar collaborative 
entity among Canadian federal, provincial, and local agencies with the addition of several 
U.S. federal law enforcement agencies that are members of the IBET. NORAD’s 
operational control of air defenses for the entire North American continent sets an 
example for a similar partnership in the maritime domain. A critical component to the 
success of all these existing models is the utilization of technology to facilitate persistent 
surveillance, data collection, information analysis, intelligence fusion, visual COP 
displays, and shared decision-making tools. Application of these elements simultaneously 
into an interoperational collaborative environment with clear lines of authority and 
responsibility provides a blueprint for a binational, interstate, interprovincial, and 
interagency solution to achieve MDA. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (USDHS, 2005) 
clearly outlines the need and intent for those entrusted with maritime security and safety 
to fully comprehend all threats in the maritime domain. The establishment of plans and 
processes, the acquisition and deployment of resources and assets to prevent threats from 
entering our ports or from engaging in illicit activities, along with the legal ability to 
respond, are critical and necessary steps. While the intent of MDA is to detect, identify, 
track, and deter the threat as far from the United States border or territorial waters as 
possible, the Great Lakes poses a unique challenge in that significant United States ports 
are contained within a closed maritime system bounded by the United States and Canada, 
with minimal distances between the two nations. The goals outlined in the various MDA 
guidelines published by the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, and 
Department of Defense apply fully to the Great Lakes environment, but elements of the 
strategy that push the threat detection and response miles offshore are unrealistic, given 
the close proximity of the border to the U.S. and Canadian shoreline. 
There is no single solution to all the security challenges that must be addressed to 
obtain complete MDA. Local infrastructure, especially critical infrastructure requiring 
elevated monitoring, patrols, prevention, and response capabilities, dictates variances in 
resource and asset requirements. Uniqueness of local geography and geology affect 1) the 
regional or local requirements and capabilities of vessel types and placement required to 
cover the navigable area, 2) the type, quantity, and location of sensors used to detect, 
identify, and monitor vessels, maritime activities, and potential threats, and 3) the types 
of agreements and jurisdictional authorities that must be in place and practiced prior to a 
security breach or major homeland security event. 
Because vessels traversing the Great Lakes pass through waters adjoining 
multiple states and provinces within miles (and often yards) of shore, traveling from port 
to port while crossing in and out of various jurisdictions, the Great Lakes must be viewed 
as a single system for homeland security, rather than as a series of specific ports, as 
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outlined in the Port Safety Act of 2006. The proximity of the border—with the distance 
between the shores of the United States and Canada being, in some cases, less than one 
mile—requires binational participation and cooperation to ensure that the integrity of the 
Great Lakes system remains unchallenged. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations draw from the models and requirements 
previously discussed in Chapters IV and V and apply them to the unique environment of 
the Great Lakes. These recommendations expand on the concepts and actions already 
taken along the northern maritime border to consolidate the system-wide view in a Great 
Lakes MDA COP. The intent is to enhance the ability of those entrusted with security on 
the Great Lakes system, as well as those in local ports and jurisdictions, to recognize and 
understand the threats at all levels requiring coordination and response. 
The vast area and number of jurisdictions located along the shores of the Great 
Lakes indicate a significant need to follow the SAFE Port Act requirements of 
establishing port-centric or Captain of the Port–centric Interagency Operations Centers 
(IOCs). These should be located at the major ports, collocated with or in close proximity 
to Coast Guard or Customs and Border Protection sector command centers. As 
demonstrated in the model provided by the Charleston Harbor Operations Center 
(SeaHawk), these IOCs ought to include representation of all federal, state, and local 
agencies entrusted with homeland security and defense missions, utilizing a National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) unified command structure outlined in the 
National Response Framework. The nature of the Great Lakes environment requires an 
interconnection among all IOCs on the lakes. This necessity is illustrated by oceangoing 
vessels bound for Lake Superior that must first pass through at least two Captain of the 
Port zones prior to arriving in port. Similarly, there are no routes possible for vessels 
heading to places like Duluth, Minnesota, or Chicago, Illinois, that don’t transit through 




borders. Further, the constant travel of the commercial carriers, or “lakers,” between the 
Great Lakes ports does not lend itself to the same arrival notification process used by 
oceangoing vessels operating in the coastal ports under various nations’ flags. 
Utilizing a blended concept adapted from NORAD and SeaHawk, an overarching 
Great Lakes Maritime Operations Center (GLMOC) should be established to provide 
complete MDA oversight, collaboration, fusion of information and intelligence, and 
coordination across the Great Lakes border region. This operations center would maintain 
the full picture of maritime activity from the western end of Lake Superior in Duluth, 
Minnesota, to a point east of Quebec City, Quebec, where the St. Lawrence River enters 
the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The GLMOC should be a binational, interagency, multistate 
and multiprovince entity that provides a system-wide approach to maintaining an MDA 
COP, with a primary focus on facilitating unified prevention and response activities for 
threats inherent in the Great Lakes system. 
B. GREAT LAKES MARITIME OPERATIONS CENTER ORGANIZATION 
To operate effectively as a permanently established operations center, the 
GLMOC should blend the military structure for a unified command with that of the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS). To clarify and distinguish between the 
unified command structures, the military construct of unity of command “runs from the 
President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of the combatant command to 
the DOD on-scene commander” (USDHS, 2008a). In contrast, all jurisdictions 
represented in a NIMS-based unified command “jointly provide management direction to 
an incident through a common set of incident objectives and strategies and a single 
Incident Action Plan” where “each agency maintains its authority, responsibility and 
accountability” (USDHS, 2008a, p. 48). While a primary function of the GLMOC is to 
provide intelligence and coordination of resources and assets or to facilitate assistance to 
the local NIMS incident commander, unified command, or IOC, the purpose of the 
GLMOC is to maintain a Great Lakes system-wide perspective on a not-to-interfere basis 
with local command and jurisdictional control of mission execution or response activities. 
For the United States, the GLMOC commander reports to the secretary of the Department 
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of Homeland Security, rather than a single DHS component or agency. For Canada, the 
GLMOC commander reports to the Canadian Minister of Public Safety or the appointed 
delegate. 
The resident staff of the GLMOC, while permanently or administratively assigned 
and owned by the responsible agency or governing jurisdiction, would be operationally 
controlled or responsible to the GLMOC command structure. This ensures that the 
system-wide monitoring and processing of Great Lakes maritime information is viewed 
on a systems level rather than exclusively at the represented agency or jurisdiction port-
centric view. In this regard, the construct for daily operations more closely mirrors a 
military unified command structure similar to NORAD, modified for an interagency, 
multistate, binational unified command structure (see Figure 8). Each major federal (U.S. 
or Canadian) agency and each state or province should provide adequate staffing to 
represent its respective jurisdiction in each of the eight unified command functional 
staffs. 
The unified commander and deputy commander could be alternated between a 
senior appointee from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety 
Canada, but both positions cannot simultaneously be from the same nation. The U.S. 
DHS representative may be appointed from the department or any of its subordinate 
agencies but should be at the flag officer or senior executive service level with full 
department-wide authority delegated directly from the DHS secretary. 
Agency and state or provincial representatives in each functional area serve as 
peers under a facilitator to ensure work efforts are coordinated without a rank or 





Figure 8.   Great Lakes Maritime Operations Center Proposed Command Structure 
Including Primary Functional Areas Modeled after U.S. Department of Defense 
Unified Command or Joint Staff Structures 
Maintaining the system-wide perspective, the functional areas collect data, fuse 
information and analyze intelligence, and promptly disseminate operational and tactical 
intelligence to the responsible jurisdiction or incident command post to take appropriate 
action. Additionally, the functional areas develop system-wide plans and agreements for 
ratification and approval by the federal agencies, state or provincial governors, with 
appropriate consideration for local government adoption as determined by the responsible 
governor. Since each federal agency, state, and province will have various members 
assigned full time to the GLMOC, each jurisdiction must identify one member of its 
contingent as the lead. The designated lead will serve as the jurisdiction’s voice to the 
GLMOC senior management team to ensure that unity of effort throughout the GLMOC 
is achieved. Jurisdictional representatives will fulfill their functional area responsibilities 
under the unified staff element, but will be administratively responsible to their 
jurisdiction’s designated lead. 
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The top level of the unified command should be made up of a single agency 
representative with full reach-back authority from each federal agency with mission 
execution and jurisdictional authority along the Great Lakes, including all border-related 
mission sets. As peers within the top level of the unified command, each border state or 
province maintaining a significant Great Lakes port would have a single primary 
representative who is appointed to speak with the state’s collective authority for their 
state’s governor or homeland security director in their assigned functional area. Canadian 
agency and provincial representatives in peer roles to the United States federal agencies 
and state governors would have an equal voice in the GLMOC unified command. In this 
regard, the collaborative command environment should model the binational structure of 
the existing NORAD construct used to maintain positive control over the North American 
air space. Specifically, the structure should have multijurisdictional collaborative 
command elements that facilitate analysis, mission planning, and execution by addressing 
1) manpower and personnel, 2) intelligence, 3) operations, 4) logistics, 5) strategic plans 
and policy, 6) command, control, communications, and computer systems, 7) operational 
plans and interagency development, and 8) interagency force structure, resources, and 
assessments. Additionally, authority to initiate integrated cross-border maritime law 
enforcement operations as authorized by the U.S. and Canadian governments (US–
Canada Framework Agreement, 2009) should be used to its fullest extent on a Great 
Lakes system-wide basis in addition to a function of port-centric IOC mission 
coordination and execution. 
C. GLMOC COMMON OPERATING PICTURE 
To have a fully functional COP, GLMOC will have to leverage all available 
sources of information from across Great Lakes federal, state, and local jurisdictions and 
fuse the information into intelligence that is disseminated to agencies, states, or local 
organizations with the requisite jurisdictional authority to address the threat or issue. 
Regardless of the C4IT decision-making tool chosen as the COP software platform, the 
critical first step is to establish an integrated network of sensors to allow for persistent 
surveillance of the entire Great Lakes system by the GLMOC staff. The sensor network 
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must include AIS transmit-and-receive capabilities and encrypted AIS for blue-force 
tracking of all vessel classes meeting the international and United States AIS carriage 
requirements. Integration of the AIS tracking information coupled with the MDA 
databases will provide extensive visibility and real-time tracking of vessels required to 
carry AIS.  
Of great concern is the risk posed by small vessels, including privately owned 
recreational vessels, operating on the Great Lakes. As noted in the DHS Small Vessel 
Security Strategy, “small vessels might be used to smuggle terrorists or WMD into the 
United States or might be used as either a stand-off weapon platform or as a m eans of a 
direct attack with a WBIED. The resulting risks are difficult to manage because small 
vessels are not centrally registered, operators have not always demonstrated proficiency 
in small vessel operations, and the ability to screen or detect vessel-borne hazards is 
extremely limited. There is, moreover, a tradition and expectation among the large 
population of small vessel operators of largely unrestricted access to U.S. waterways” 
(USDHS, 2008b, p. iv). To address these concerns and the lack of enough homeland 
security and law enforcement patrol personnel to effectively cover the entire expanse of 
U.S. and Canadian shoreline with round-the-clock patrols, technology must be leveraged 
to its fullest extent in order to conduct persistent surveillance of the small vessels 
operating throughout the Great Lakes system.  
A radar surveillance system, similar to those used by the U.S. Coast Guard in its 
Vessel Traffic Services, should be installed that provides full coverage of the Great Lakes 
system. The radar system should fully integrate with the AIS feeds to correlate the actual 
locations of vessels with the data emitted from the AIS units located on the Class A and 
Class B vessels.7 Radar feeds should also be tied to a set of rules that highlight vessels,  
 
                                                 
7 Class A AIS carriage is mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for vessels 300 
gross tons and greater engaged on international voyages, cargo ships 500 gross tons or more not engaged 
on international voyages, and all passenger ships carrying more than 12 passengers regardless of size. 
Class B AIS is not mandated by the IMO and has been developed for non-SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) 
commercial and recreational vessels. IMO International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, Chapter V, 
1974, December 2002 amendments, adopted 13 December 2002 and entered into force July 1, 2004 
(http://www.imo.org/).  
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including the small vessels addressed above, that are in violation of border crossing 
regulations, security zone management, or where IOC or GLMOC watchstanders paint a 
target on a vessel of interest.  
Wherever critical infrastructure, maritime activity (commercial or recreational), 
and geologically conducive shore features exist for illegal activity, video and infrared 
cameras should be installed. Additionally, all areas that have minimal distances between 
the United States and Canada need to maintain full visual surveillance. These areas 
include the St. Lawrence River, the Niagara River, the St. Clair River, and St. Mary’s 
River. The sensor data should be received locally with video data sources controlled and 
operated by the local jurisdictions.  
The Great Lakes system-wide COP should be built with initial focus on creating 
the network for persistent surveillance throughout the local ports, Captains of the Port, 
DHS command centers, and Canadian MSOC. The data sources should be integrated 
locally, and then connected to an enterprise architecture that is accessible to the GLMOC 
COP and other local port command centers as necessary. Acknowledging that not all 
local and state first responders have access to federal classified information, information 
sources should be distributed, to the degree possible, at the lowest acceptable security 
classification on a need-to-share basis for tactical action in the local ports. On a strategic 
and operational planning level, information obtained from the network of sensors should 
be pulled into the classified system for planning and detailed information, to be 
synthesized and shared with proper authorities in the federal, state, and provincial levels 
of government. 
The overarching technical strategy should define and utilize a service-oriented 
enterprise architecture that allows for complete integration of sensor technologies into a 
single COP using non-proprietary or open architecture standards and protocols. This will 
facilitate the merging of existing databases and information technology infrastructure into   
a common enterprise solution that enhances the manipulation, analysis, display, and 
decision-making tools available. Additionally the use of open architecture will promote 
interoperability between agency-specific information technology systems, while 
providing greater flexibility for future modifications as operational requirements evolve. 
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While the IOCs maintain their focus on port-centric threats, activities, and 
concerns, the GLMOC would fuse the information obtained from each of the IOCs and 
Canada’s MSOC. The GLMOC staff needs to assemble and analyze the various pieces of 
information with the data feeds populating the COP to detect and identify system-wide 
threats to better understand and mitigate risks throughout the Great Lakes system. As 
intelligence is formed, it must be quickly disseminated back to the IOCs or MSOC for the 
appropriate federal, state, or local jurisdictions to assign the appropriate resources and 
assets to deter, thwart, apprehend, or neutralize the threat. 
D. END REMARKS 
Current maritime homeland security strategies and doctrine attempt to ascertain 
and intercept threats well offshore or prior to entering domestic waters. However, they do 
not adequately address the close proximity between the United States and Canada along 
the Great Lakes and interconnecting rivers. The contiguity of the border prevents either 
nation from unilaterally exercising its maritime sovereignty to detect, identify, intercept, 
thwart, or otherwise neutralize homeland security threats prior to impacting its nation’s 
ports or maritime domain. 
The piecemeal nature of port-centric efforts of disparate pieces of information as 
currently managed prevents a system-wide approach and permits a variety of threats 
(small vessels, weapons, human trafficking, illegal drugs, counterfeit money, etc.) to 
enter unnoticed. A system-wide approach with the input and cooperation of all parties 
could begin to close the gap. As the two nations continue to work together to meet the 
threats, their cooperation on maritime domain awareness may well lay the foundation for 
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